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1 Introduction 
The current civil nuclear market situation is being called a “nuclear renaissance” (World Nuclear 
Association, 2014) due to the increased number of orders on hand after the long period of market 
recession and stagnation. Since a nuclear power plant is the object of high-inherited risks, special 
licensing processes are needed for safety justification. The significance of the licensing for the 
licensee is important due to the reasons related to regulatory risks presented in table 1 (Söderholm, 
2013): 
Regulatory risks Consequences 
License(s) delayed Delay in schedule, cost overrun (financing costs) 
Substantial re-design required in 
licensing process 
Cost overrun, delays, trouble with vendor, contract 
disagreement 
Construction license not granted Loss of investment incurred until then 
Regulatory approvals during 
construction not granted 
Cost overrun, delays 
Operating permit not granted Stranded investment 
License(s) cancelled by court of law Delay (if amended license is issued) loss of investment (if 
not) 
Table 1. Regulatory risks and theirs consequences 
Weak preparation for the licensing and improper following of the standards by a project participant 
and/or ambiguous requirements set by the regulatory documents might lead to significant revenue 
losses. Such an example is a current construction of the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant (NPP), 
Finland, where reactor instrumentation and control (I&C) system architecture was approved years 
later than it was expected, which led to reputational and financial damages (World Nuclear Industry 
Status Report, 2014). 
Current trends of the commercial nuclear industry include: 
• Cost overruns and operation delays due to the licensing issues; 
• Emergence of the countries with a lack of the nuclear experience; 
• Extreme growth of international collaboration within new nuclear build projects. 
Clearly, these trends either directly or indirectly relate to legislative issues. A unified, transparent 
legislative base might then be a solution for the whole market, which would: 
• Decrease the overall cost of the project due to the lack of necessity of compliance to several 
regulation environments; 
• Facilitate the enactment of regulation for countries without nuclear experience; 
• Facilitate the mutual work and understanding between international partners; 
• Establish unified common practices of legislation compliance evaluation. 
Calls for transparent and unified regulations have been made for years by the establishment of 
working groups such as MDEP, WENRA, and CORDEL. Despite all efforts, Söderholm (2013) states 
that harmonization of regulations is a very challenging and slow process in Europe, which is even 
slower on the world-wide scale. 
In keeping with this multinational movement of regulations convergence, the aim of this paper is to 
create a harmonized core between IEC and IEEE regulations with regard to the verification and 
validation processes (V&V) of safety systems software. Heimdahl (2007) claims that V&V processes 
usually constitute up to 50-70 % of development life cycle. Thus, V&V processes can be regarded as 
the most important aspect during the development of critical software. In this paper, it will be 
assumed that the V&V life cycle spans the phases from requirements engineering to the start of 
operation. 
Thomson (2012) claimed that no one-to-one mapping between IEC and IEEE regulations within I&C 
software can be found since they cover different topics. At the same time, a group of Russian 
experts (Anokhin et al., 2009) noticed some intersections amongst them. 
The objective of the paper is to define a common ground (shared processes and objects) between  
IEC and IEEE regulations in the context of software verification and validation, as well as their 
correlation, and to show how the rigorous model-based methodology can be applied for the 
legislation harmonization in the rest of the subjects. 
2 Nuclear power plant instrumentation and control systems 
I&C systems measure and assess technological parameters of nuclear power plant processes, initiate 
and control equipment actuation, provide forecasts and post analysis. The significance of I&C 
systems can be different since each of them addresses different functions in terms of overall plant 
safety and importance. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the top-level governing body 
for all participants of the civil nuclear market, breakdowns all I&C systems in two broad classes: 
systems important to safety and systems not important to safety. The first one in its own turn is 
divided to safety and safety related systems (IAEA NS-G-1.3, 2002). 
In accordance with IAEA, the principle of distinguishing between safety and safety related system is 
as follows (IAEA NS-G-1.3, 2002): 
1. ‘I&C safety systems’ are I&C systems important to safety that perform the primary safety 
functions i.e., they assure the safe shutdown of the reactor or the removal of residual heat 
from the core, or they limit the consequences of anticipated operational occurrences and 
design basis accidents; 
2. ‘Safety related I&C systems’ are I&C systems important to safety that perform other 
functions important to safety which are not performed by I&C safety systems. 
The IAEA classification of the NPP I&C systems is not the only one. There are at least dozen others, 
which are implemented in particular regions or countries. Next table 2 shows other classifications 
with rough comparison among them completed by IAEA (IAEA NP-T-3.12, 2011): 
National or 
international 
standard 
Classification of the importance to safety 
IAEA NS-R-1 Systems Important to Safety Systems Not Important 
to Safety Safety Safety Related 
IEC 61226 
Functions 
Systems Important to Safety Unclassified 
Cat. A Cat. B Category C 
Systems Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 
Canada Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4 
France N4 1E 2E SH Important to 
safety 
Systems Not Important 
to Safety 
European 
Utility 
Requirements 
F1A (Auto) F1B (Auto and 
Man.) 
F2 Unclassified 
Japan PS1/MS1* PS2/MS2 PS3/MS3 Non-nuclear Safety 
Rep. of Korea IC-1 IC-2 IC-3 
Russian 
Federation 
Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 (Systems Not 
Important to Safety) 
Switzerland Category A Category B Category C Not Important to Safety 
UK 
Functions 
Systems 
Systems Important to Safety Unclassified 
Cat. A 
Class 1 
Cat. B 
Class 2 
Category C 
Class 3 
USA and IEEE Systems Important to Safety Non-nuclear Safety 
Safety Related, 
Safety or Class 
1E 
(No name assigned) 
Table 2. I&C systems/functions classification 
Comparison can be made only within similar boundary of the functional determination. From table 
2, it is seen that the classes listed above do not strictly correspond to each other; but at least they 
share a subset of the most critical I&C systems.  
The most noticed, quoted and widely applied regulatory documents can be found within IEEE and 
IEC families of standards. IEC is mostly popular throughout the European market, whilst 
implementation of IEEE standards usually can be found in the USA and other parts of the world.  
Attention from the regulatory bodies to the software is caused by software hidden complexity, 
which are summarised in the following issues (Yastrebenetsky and Kharchenko, 2014): 
1. Software as a part of bigger system shall comply with system regulations; 
2. Software defects are likely to occur, which makes them a common cause failure; 
3. The use of a software tools for software development can introduce errors; 
4. Reliability of software seems to be impossible to calculate. 
The International Electrotechnical Commission covers issues related to the software executing “A” 
category functions in the corresponding standard IEC 60880. Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers addresses software issues in the umbrella standard IEEE Std 7-4.3.2, where diverse topics 
including software & hardware quality, reliability, and common cause failure protection are 
discussed. However, in terms of V&V aspects, it prescribes to use IEEE 1012. 
Wood, Halcomb, Johnson, Korsah have built standards’ profiles for both IAEA/IEC and IEEE/NRC 
regulations where in the context of V&V requirements for safety systems software they made a 
correspondence between IEEE 1012 and IEC 60880 (Wood et al., 2009). Those standards have been 
chosen for the common ground determination by implementation of a rigorous methodology 
 
3 Methodology 
It is commonly known that the reading of standards can easily lead to misunderstanding and loss of 
some important aspects of meaning: standards can often be inconsistent with themselves and 
contain many errors and much ambiguity; furthermore, it can be almost impossible to follow the 
standards when they are read in groups due to diversity of interpretation (Holt and Perry, 2008). 
Due to listed drawbacks of the standards, one approach which can be taken to address the issues is 
model-based systems engineering (hereinafter, modelling), as models can provide information in a 
more intuitive and less entangled manner. Holt and Perry (2008) state that modelling could serve as 
a common language of standards creation. Their proposed so-called seven-view approach to the 
modelling processes can be also applied to the modelling of standards.  
A group of experts from Finland (Lahtinen et al., 2010) conducted research related to the search for 
a common ground amongst some civil nuclear standards, comparing textual requirements by 
subject-matter expertise analysis. In such a case, the way proposed by Holt and Perry for using a 
model-based approach to describe standards could support consideration and analysis of existing 
standards and be more rigorous. 
In this paper, a model-based approach will be used for the analysis and harmonization of V&V 
systems embodied in two different IEC and IEEE standards discussed above. We propose the 
following methodology: 
1. Select a standard to be used as a reference model; 
2. Perform requirements analysis of both standards; 
3. Develop behavioural and structural SysML models of the reference standard based on the 
requirements analysis (modelling of the process flows and objects); 
4. Verify the SysML model of the reference standard; 
5. Apply requirements of another standard to the reference model. 
IEC 60880 has fewer requirements regarding V&V processes; hence, modelling of the IEC 60880 V&V 
system seems to be more efficient in terms of common core determination. Thus, IEC 60880 is 
therefore selected as a reference model, whereas IEEE 1012 is used as a source of requirements to 
compare two V&V systems 
4 Rules establishment 
High-level constraints and limitations are introduced in order to facilitate the consideration of the 
text of each of these standards and to stay within the paper’s scope. To this end, the following main 
rules of clause filtering are introduced (see Table 3): 
Tag Description Example 
MR1 Only “shall” statements are considered, 
“should” statements are not considered 
Code verification activities should begin with 
module source code analysis followed by 
module testing 
MR2 Statements related to enabling 
processes are not considered 
There shall be adequate provision for the 
processing and resolution of all safety issues 
raised during the verification activities 
performed either during software 
development by the supplier or by a third-
party assessment 
MR3 Statements, which describe something 
from the production life cycle viewpoint 
rather than from the V&V viewpoint, 
are not considered 
This plan shall specify the standards and 
procedures to be followed in the system 
integration 
MR4 Statements, related to the V&V 
methods or techniques instead of the 
V&V process itself, are not considered 
The source code analysis may be performed 
using verification methods such as code 
inspection, possibly with the assistance of 
automated tools 
MR5 Statements, which have references to 
another standards or appendices, are 
not considered 
For further guidance concerning the 
verification of data produced using 
application data tools, see 14.3.5. 
MR6 Statements considered not relevant 
such as an examples or explanations are 
not considered 
Other aspects of data may have to be 
developed from the system requirements, 
for example the allocation of signal inputs to 
specific input cards, the contents of 
message buffers 
MR7 Statements with regard to V&V 
performed by the system V&V team 
(not the software V&V team) are not 
considered 
The integrated system test shall be reviewed 
and the test results evaluated by a 
verification team with a good knowledge of 
the system specification. 
Table 3. Main rules 
The primary problem of text understanding is semantics: some words can be interpreted differently 
depending on the reader experience in a subject area. Dickerson and Mavris (2009) have presented 
a practice, where they transformed natural language into the UML class diagrams in order not to 
introduce any additional information to the model. 
Due to the nature of the V&V systems considered, we require that the modelling language needs to 
allow the modelling of: requirements, operations, control flows, object flows, and objects and actors 
with their attributes. Based on these needs, the SysML language was chosen for modelling activities 
throughout a V&V project, using activity, block and requirements diagrams.  
The IEC 60880 narrative alternately addresses operations and objects issues; therefore, it is 
necessary to establish rules for semantical representation of both operations and objects using 
SysML activity and block diagrams. This transformation must be consistent; otherwise, it would be 
just a free interpretation done on a case-to-case basis. 
Following the ideas proposed by Dickerson and Mavris, the next rules, presented in Table 4, were 
introduced to represent operations and objects:  
Tag Description 
AR1 “shall do” statement written in a verb-form is represented as an activity node 
AR2 “shall do” statement written in a noun-form is represented as an activity node 
AR3 Statement with two or more operations connected by conjunctive “and” without explicit 
declaration of their separate execution is considered as a single activity node 
AR4 An event interrupting the workflow is represented as interruption node with corresponding 
control flow and interruptible region 
AR5 Options selection regarding any operation is considered as a decision node with 
corresponding control flows to available options 
AR6 Objects representing an information flow are considered as an activity input/output pins 
BR1 A set of people, described as a team, or even single individuals, are considered as an actor 
represented as a block node (in activity diagrams represented as a swim lane if necessary) 
BR2 Communication amongst actors is represented as an association relation with attached block 
describing the attributes of that relation (see BR3) 
BR3 A property of a considered association relation amongst actors is considered as an attribute 
of that relation (see BR2) 
BR4 A property of actor, that describes it, or things that actor has in possession, is considered as 
an attribute of the block representing the actor 
BR5 An object mentioned throughout the standard is represented as a block node 
BR6 A property of an object that describes it, is considered as an attribute of the block 
representing the object 
BR7 If an object / actor is considered as an important/primary/inalienable part of something, 
then the part association relation (composition) is used 
Table 4. Interpretation rules 
The rules listed in Table 4 define a general transformation from the natural language to the graphical 
form. However, due to the ambiguity and vagueness of natural language, the certainty of 
operations/objects/actors considered must be under control, and accordingly represented as well. 
An algorithm of object certainty determination and its graphical representation within activity 
diagrams is presented in Table 5:  
Decision (to be made) Description Tag Graphical representation 
Was the object defined in 
the definition chapter? 
Reference is given in the 
definition chapter 
D Filled pin with bold black 
borders 
Was the object defined in 
the text? 
Properties are described in 
the text 
DT Filled pin with regular black 
borders 
Was the object separately 
defined in the definition 
chapter? 
 
All of N words of the term 
are defined in the definition 
chapter, but separately 
SD No representation due to lack 
of the IEC 60880 SD terms  
Was the object partly 
defined in the definition 
Equal or less than N-1 words 
of the term are defined in 
PD White pin with regular black 
chapter? the definition chapter borders 
Was the object implied? No explicit definition is 
given 
I White pin with white borders 
Table 5. Objects certainty determination algorithm 
This algorithm proceeds downwards through the table until a “yes” answer is achieved. Execution of 
such an algorithm gives a foundation for dictionary creation, objects certainty, and the 
corresponding graphical representation in the model. A similar graphical representation has also 
been developed in the context of block diagrams to distinguish the level of certainty. 
Not only objects can have different levels of certainty; but also, the same can be said about 
operations. Rules regarding the certainty of operations are listed in Table 6: 
Tag Description Graphical representation 
DI Decision is implied Diamond node with regular contour 
DE Decision is explicitly defined Diamond node with bold contour 
AI Activity is implied Activity node with regular contour 
AE Activity is explicitly defined Activity node with bold contour 
SI The sequence of operations is not 
specified (parallel sequence is assumed 
with use of forks/joints nodes) 
Regular control flow lines and fork/join 
nodes 
SE The sequence of operations is explicitly 
specified 
Bold control flow line 
SCS If a sequence of operations is not explicitly 
specified, but a right sequence is dictated 
by common sense, then consecutive 
control flow is used 
Regular control flow line 
Table 6. Operations certainty tags determination 
5 Modelling 
5.1 IEC 60880 V&V system 
All of these rules made a foundation for rigorous graphical representation and further analysis of the 
IEC 60880 V&V system. The process of IEC 60880 textual requirements analysis is specified by the 
following three step algorithm by allocation of the: 
• Main rules tags if there are any; 
• Operation/object tags; 
• Certainty level tags. 
The next example, presented in Table 7, shows how the allocation of tags proceeds based on clause 
8.1.9 from the IEC 60880 standard: 
“8.1.9 The software verification activities shall confirm the adequacy of the software requirements 
specification in fulfilling the system requirements assigned to the software by the system 
specification.” 
№ Set of words Type Tag 
1 Software requirements specification Object BR5, AR6, DT 
2 System specification Object BR5, AR6, PD 
 System requirements  (constituent of system specification) 
3 Shall confirm the adequacy of the software 
requirements specification in fulfilling the system 
requirements assigned to the software by the 
system specification. 
Activity AR1, AE, SE 
Table 7. Natural language analysis example 
As a result, the skeleton of IEC 60880 V&V system model contains the following views: 
• Requirements; 
• Actor; 
• Object; 
• Process. 
The “Process view” corresponds to a so-called “process behaviour view” in the terms of Holt and 
Perry approach. The “Actor view” corresponds to the “stakeholder view”, and the “Object view” 
corresponds to “process-structure view”. The last view, which is not represented in the Holt and 
Perry structure, is the “Requirements view”, which contains a requirements tree formed of IEC 
60880 clauses. 
The graphical model in figure 1 shows how the modelling process was performed for the IEC 60880 
requirements verification process using the rules established in Tables 4-6 and provides an example 
of how the graphical elements were drawn based on the allocated tags in Table 7.  
 
 
 Figure 1. Requirements verification process model 
The requirements verification process model was developed by consideration of the following IEC 
60880 clauses: 8.2.1.1, 8.1.9, 8.1.8, 8.1.14, 8.1.13. It is shown by white rectangles, with a line inside, 
connected to the model elements, which act as an integrity check. It was done in order to check that 
the model does not contain any errors, and therefore is ready for the IEEE 1012 requirements 
allocation and harmonization. 
Next, the following two methods for model verification are introduced: 
• An integrity check; 
• A consistency check. 
The integrity check implies the examination of the model against the requirements on which the 
model was built. This kind of examination has a reverse character as it allows allocating 
requirements from the IEC 60880 requirements tree to the model. Allocation is performed by a 
connection of the requirements nodes to the corresponding model element using the abstraction 
class of “satisfy”. These connections enable a full traceability between the model and the 
requirements. To exclude the chance of missed requirements, all of the requirements were scanned 
one by one using a special specification manager function embedded in a commercial modelling 
tool. This allows for checking whether each of the requirements is allocated to any element.  
The term ‘consistency check’ means the ability to execute processes from the IEC 60880 V&V system 
model, since this would be the guarantee that the processes are meaningful, coherent and 
consistent within themselves in terms of formal logic. Such check is performed by special function 
embedded in the modelling tool, which allows a user to execute created model in an interactive way 
to ensure the model is correct.  
5.2 IEEE 1012 V&V requirements tree 
In order to allow application of IEEE 1012 requirements nodes to the reference model, the 
requirements tree of IEEE 1012 chapter 9 “Software V&V activities” was modelled. 
It should be mentioned that during the modelling of the IEEE 1012 V&V system requirement tree, 
requirements related to criticality assessment were omitted due to already defined criticality class 
by the parent standard, IEEE 7-4.3.2, which is equivalent to the software integrity level 4 (SIL 4) (IEEE 
7-4.3.2, 2010). 
An IEEE 1012 V&V system dictionary similar to IEC 60880 was developed following the same 
algorithm described in the table 5. 
6 V&V systems comparison  
Before application of the requirements can be done, a step back should be taken in order to look at 
the standards from the highest level of consideration in order to understand features. This will affect 
harmonization. 
6.1 IEC 60880 V&V system 
IEC 60880 standard considers software as a part/element of the bigger I&C system and specifically 
not as a system in terms of systems engineering concepts (IEC 60880, 2006). Another important 
aspect of the IEC 60880 standard is the differentiation of software by the type of method used for its 
creation. These are: 
• General-purpose languages; 
• Application-oriented languages; 
• Configuration of pre-developed software. 
6.2 IEEE 1012 V&V system 
A distinct feature of the IEEE 1012 standard is an existence of four separate phases of software V&V: 
construction, integration, qualification, and acceptance. The IEEE 1012 standard considers software 
as a system in terms of systems engineering concepts, and not as an element like it is in IEC 60880. 
This is based on a strict alignment of the standards to the development processes described in 
ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288 and ISO/IEC 12207, and due to the life cycle proposed by the IEEE 1012 (IEEE 
1012, 2012). 
6.3 V&V systems correspondence 
A significant mismatch among life cycle phases of two V&V systems is observed, although logically 
they represent the same period of software verification and validation: from the requirements up to 
the start of operation. Due to the specific features of the standards mentioned above, their life 
cycles phases correspond to each other in a way depicted in figure 2.   
Software
 concept V&V
Software
 requirements
 analysis V&V
Software
 design V&V
Software
 construction V&V
Software
 integration
 test V&V
Software
 qualification
 test V&V
Software
 acceptance
 test V&V
Software
 installation & 
checkout V&V
Software aspects of 
system validation
Software aspects of 
integrated system 
verification
Software 
implementation
verification
Software
design verification
Software
 requirements 
specification 
verification
IEEE 1012
IEC 60880
 
Figure 2. Logical correspondence between two V&V systems 
The “IEC 60880 Software requirements specification” phase corresponds to the “IEEE 1012 software 
requirements analysis V&V” phase; but no direct matching between “IEEE 1012 Software concept 
V&V” and any of the IEC 60880 phases is found, as IEC 60880 is not concerned about software 
concept in the context of its semantical meaning taken from the IEEE 1012. One of the most 
transparent conformities, observed among two V&V systems, is the design phase since “IEEE 1012 
Software design V&V” fully corresponds to the “IEC 60880 Software design verification”. 
Based on a logical analysis it was found that three IEEE 1012 phases, namely, “software construction 
V&V”, “software integration test V&V” and “software qualification V&V” could correspond to IEC 
60880 implementation verification phase. 
The next phases are even more complicated, as no direct connection between the phases can be 
made. The last phases on both sides correspondence can then only be considered in a blended 
manner, which is depicted by arcs in figure 2. Such complexity grows from the different approaches 
regarding the software. IEC 60880 considers it as an element; but IEEE 1012 looks at it as a system. 
Therefore, it is impossible to untangle the two phases on both sides and match them to another 
side. 
6.4 Dictionaries comparison 
The last aspect of standards feature considerations is their dictionary comparison. Figure 3 shows 
the distribution of objects involved in V&V processes in the context of their certainty in accordance 
with table 5.  
 
Figure 3. IEEE 1012 V&V system objects certainty distribution 
It can be seen that IEC 60880 has higher proportion of the overall certainty compared to IEEE 1012. 
Another factor worthy of attention is the significant difference in number of objects involved.  
Comparison between the two dictionaries shows that 10 of 15 IEC 60880 V&V system objects have 
some relevant IEEE 1012 V&V system objects. These correspondences are not one-to-one relations, 
as IEEE 1012 has 163 objects and sometimes several objects from IEEE 1012 V&V system can 
correspond to one of the IEC 60880 V&V system objects. 
7 IEEE 1012 requirements application to IEC 60880 V&V system model  
The process of harmonization in mathematical logic corresponds to the operation “AND”. Hence, 
strict exact similarities must be found between the IEC 60880 V&V and IEEE 1012 V&V systems if 
they are to support harmonization.  
Following our proposed methodology and analysis of the possible common ground amongst the 
standards, the application of IEEE 1012 V&V system requirements to the verified IEC 60880 V&V 
system model using the SysML connection abstraction “satisfy” was performed. 
An example of such an allocation is shown in figure 4 where, for instance, “software requirements 
specification adequacy check” satisfies the requirement 9.2.1.a.1 of the IEEE 1012 V&V system: 
 
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
Defined
Defined in the text
Separately defined
Partly defined
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Defined Defined in thetext
Separately
defined Partly defined Implied
IEEE 1012 4 6 10 9 134
IEC 60880 1 10 0 2 2
IEEE 1012 IEC 60880
  
Figure 4. IEEE requirement allocation example 
IEEE 1012 requirements are represented as a requirement node with filling; and IEC 60880 
requirements are represented as white rectangles. The requirements of the IEEE 1012 standard are 
not atomic and describe several things in one clause. Hence, to distinguish this level of 
correspondence, two types of border width were introduced. The bold contour means that IEEE 
1012 requirement is fully satisfied by the IEC 60880 V&V element/elements; whereas a regular 
contour means that IEEE 1012 requirement is only partly satisfied by the IEC 60880 V&V system 
element/elements.  
8 Harmonized core modelling 
The introduction of three different types of software and different approach regarding 
system/element consideration led to the fact that no place was found for the implementation 
verification and for the integrated system verification and validation phases. This is attributed to the 
use of the logical operand “AND”. 
Thus, only some of the phases of requirements and design verification can be harmonized easily, 
which is due to their transparent correspondence amongst the standards. These phases are the 
requirements verification and the design verification. 
From the objects viewpoint, the core is elaborated from the developed dictionaries. The core objects 
can be found in the table 8. The logical operand “AND” requires selecting only those that strictly 
correspond to each other in a one-to-one multiplicity relation. 
IEC 608880 V&V system object IEEE 1012 V&V system corresponding object 
System specification Concept documentation (system requirements) 
Software requirements specification Software requirements specification 
Software design verification report Task report 
Table 8. The core objects 
Actors view of the core is absent since IEEE 1012 does not use any explicit naming of the actors 
involved. An example of the harmonized requirements verification process is depicted in figure 5. 
Note that where the adopted graphical rules that were implemented throughout the paper are no 
longer relevant; the default notation is used.  
 
Figure 5. The harmonized software requirements verification process 
9 Quantitative analysis of the core 
Despite the fact that the IEEE 1012 standard was not modelled, it is still possible to calculate the 
correlation between the core and IEEE 1012 standard based on the outcomes of harmonization 
process.  
Firstly, based on the modelling of requirement tree of the IEEE 1012 standard, it is possible to count 
a number of unique requirements (each unique requirement that is equivalent to each clause of the 
IEEE 1012). Secondly, based on the introduction of the requirement satisfaction level, it is possible to 
define how many of IEEE 1012 unique requirements were fully satisfied by the core. Therefore, by 
matching these two numbers, the ratio of how the core corresponds to the IEEE 1012 standard has 
been calculated.  
act [Package] Requirements v erification process [Requirements v erification process]     
SRSSS
Software requirements verification
SS SRS
Software requirements specification adequacy 
check
ActivityInitial
8.1.8 Each development 
phase verification
(from 8.1 Software verification 
process)
8.1.9 Software 
requirements 
specification fulfillment
(from 8.1 Software verification 
process)
ActivityFinal
9.2.1 Required inputs
(from 9.2.1 Requirements 
evaluation)
9.2.1.a.1 System 
requirements fulfillment
(from 9.2.1.a Correctness)
«abstraction»
«satisfy»
«abstraction»
«satisfy»
«abstraction»
«satisfy»
«abstraction»
«satisfy»
«abstraction»
«satisfy»
The number of IEEE 1012 requirements taken into consideration within the adopted assumptions is 
equal to 414; whereas, only eight correspondences can be found in the core. Of these, only four are 
fully satisfied. 
The same indicator was calculated for IEC 60880. Total number of IEC 60880 unique requirements 
taken into consideration is 64; whereas only five correspondences can be found in the core. Of 
these, only three are fully satisfied.  
Values of the calculated indicators are depicted in figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. The core conformance and traceability to IEC 60880 and IEEE 1012 
Based on the dictionaries developed and the harmonized core, several different quantitative 
indicators describing the traceability between the standards can be calculated. Viewpoints such as 
objects traceability, phase traceability, general object-independent traceability, and traceability 
within the phase can be explored.  
10 Conclusions 
The indicators show that the two standards have very little directly in common in a strict sense. This 
is attributed to the completely different approaches and the emphasis implemented throughout 
them.  
However, the cross-relation of correlation numbers gives some interesting results: by satisfaction of 
the particular 1% IEEE 1012 requirements, the 4.7% conformance to IEC 60880 will be achieved. The 
opposite statement is also correct: by satisfaction of the particular 4.7% IEC 60880 requirements, the 
1% conformance to IEEE 1012 will be achieved. Certainly, these numbers are correct only within all 
of the assumptions that were made during the research, which are: 
1. V&V timeframe that was considered contains only phases from the requirements 
consideration up to the start of operation; 
2. Criticality analysis requirements of IEEE 1012 standards were not included in the amount of 
total considered requirements; 
3. Those requirements of IEC 60880 were considered, which were not filtered in accordance 
with the rules established in the table 3. 
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The extension of the current results to analysis of broader portions of the standards and due to 
imposed limitations is an opportunity for future research.  
Such results have been achieved by the rigorous implementation of the harmonization operand 
“AND”. If some concessions were made, then the results in terms of the numbers might be slight 
higher. Examples of such possible concessions include: 
1. Equalizing of the objects, which have one-to-many correspondence; 
2. Recognition that software type differentiation is negligible. 
If such concessions had been adopted, the results would change quantitatively; but not qualitatively 
since these standards, as it was shown, are completely different. This supports Thomson (2012) 
claim that there is no one-to-one mapping between major IEEE and IEC standards. Nevertheless, 
some intersections between them do exist, which supports the opinion of the group of experts from 
Russia (Anokhin et al., 2009). 
The results of this research clearly show the challenge of establishing a harmonized core and the 
difficulties of formal transferability amongst a standards family. Finally, a viewpoint that suppresses 
harmonization can be taken. For example,  Mark J. Burzynski (2015), who was responsible for the 
licensing of the Rolls-Royce SPINLINE I&C system with US NRC, has stated that conformance to 
standards is more about liaison with the regulatory body and the ability to explain what has been 
done, than strict adherence to the standards. Even so, when multiple standards must be adhered to, 
a lack of harmonization between them can only lead to conflict and misinterpretation.  
Thus, the outcomes of this research (the core and/or method itself) can be used by: 
• I&C vendors (to plan licensing activities and to define associated risks); 
• Regulators (to conduct reviews of the submitted licensing documentation); 
• Customers of I&C vendors (to conduct audit of the suppliers); 
• Standards committees (to work on further legislation environment unification). 
11 Critical analysis and recommendations for future work 
A key characteristic of our proposed methodology is the adoption of the logical operand “AND” and 
by unquestioning compliance to it. This level of compliance led to a limited harmonized core. As 
noted above, the quantitative results would be different if some concessions had been made. 
However, qualitatively the results would remain the same. 
The model-based methodology implemented in this research shows how a rigorous approach can be 
used to compare standards and determine a common ground between them. Based on the 
qualitative conclusions, it might be helpful in future research to shift the aim more towards 
unification of standards through blending. 
Blending process can benefit from the results of the found common ground. For example, 
dictionaries developed for two V&V systems can facilitate the determination of necessary and 
sufficient terminology for blended standard. Detailed analysis of each of the two V&V systems might 
then point to possible directions for a blending of general IT and more specific nuclear requirements. 
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